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Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: 
The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids 
Paul G. Cassell" 
In a recent article, Tracey E. Panek provides an interesting 
and scholarly recounting of the antipolygamy raids before 
Utah's entry into the Union.' The article, however, jumps 
beyond conclusions about this period of time and contains a 
brief suggestion that the antipolygamy raids may have had a 
permanent effect on Utahns in influencing the drafting of the 
Utah Constitution. After reviewing the antipolygamy raids, 
Panek suggests that the "members of the 1895 Utah 
Constitutional Convention understood from first-hand 
experience the necessity of adopting safeguards against 
unreasonable search and seiz~re."~ And the Convention in fact 
added a provision to the Utah Constitution, article I, section 
14, that prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures. 
From this sequence of events-the antipolygamy raids 
followed by the adoption of a Utah search and seizure 
provision-one might be tempted to  argue that the Utah 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures was intended 
to create a broad protection against law enforcement abuses 
rather than to simply track the then-prevailing law. Panek 
concludes her article by suggesting that the delegates to the 
Convention were "[ilntent on securing fbture inhabitants fkom 
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Utah College of Law. This article explores in 
more detail historical themes mentioned in Paul G. Cassell, The Mysteriow 
Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The 
Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751. I appreciatively acknowledge the helpful 
comments of Professors Ronald N. Boyce and Jean Bickmore White and the tireless 
reference work of the librarians at the University of Utah College of Law. This 
Article was supported by the University of Utah College of Law Research Fund. 
1. Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seimre in Utah: Recounting the 
Antipolygamy Raids, 62 UTAH HIST. Q. 3 16 (1994). 
2. Id. at 317. 
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the experiences of the antipolygamy raids" and that Utahns 
wanted to "cling more firmly to the very principles overrun by 
corrupt K e ~ e t h  Wallentine (among others) has 
more explicitly made this connection, arguing that "[algainst 
this history of unprecedented federal judicial abuse, arises a 
theory that the search and seizure provision in the Utah 
Constitution was included as a deliberate, considered act, 
rather than part of a wholesale importation of constitutional 
language.'" 
This inference, if correct, might have great practical 
significance. In recent opinions, the Utah Supreme Court has 
suggested that interpretation of the Utah Constitution may be 
greatly influenced by the historical events surrounding the 
drafting of the Consti t~tion.~ The court has even called on 
Utah's lawyers to provide more historical materials in their 
briefs before the court.6 If the historical interpretation 
proffered by Panek, Wallentine, and others is correct, the court 
might interpret expansively the prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures and create a concomitant restriction on 
the ability of modern-day law enforcement to fight crime. 
Defense attorneys in Utah's courts are now frequently making 
such claims on behalf of their clients. 
The inference, however, is unsupported and unsupportable. 
To infer that the search and seizure provision in the Utah 
Constitution arose from the history of antipolygamy raids is to 
commit the logical fallacy of post hoe ergo propter hoe. A more 
carefd reading of the full historical record reveals that there is 
no substantial connection between these events. Utah's search 
and seizure provision appeared in drafts of the Utah 
3. Id. at 334. 
4. Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 
267, 278-79 (1991). Wallentine relied on research by Panek in reaching his 
conclusions. Id. at 267 n.**, 276 11.64. 
5. See, e.g., Society of Separatists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921-29 
(Utah 1993) (concluding that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" and 
examining events surrounding Utah's admission to statehood to interpret state 
constitutional prohibition of expending public money to support religious exercise) 
(internal citation omitted); KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983) 
(examining court decisions "in the period prior to and contemporaneous with the 
adoption of Utah's Constitution" to interpret Utah free speech provision). 
6. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (encouraging 
attorneys to brief the court on "relevant state constitutional questions"); see also 
Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, 2 
UTAH B.J., Nov. 1989, at  25, 26-27. 
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Constitution well before the antipolygamy raids. It was simply 
copied as a standard provision found in the federal Fourth 
Amendment and many other state constitutions. Moreover, 
such an approach ignores competing traditions in the 
state-particularly concern for effective law enforcement and 
reconciliation among various religious traditions-that are 
more important in analyzing the drafting of the Utah 
Constitution. 
11. THE CONVERGENCE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be ~e ized .~  
The impetus for this provision can be traced back to well before 
the start of the antipolygamy raids. The Constitution of the 
State of Deseret, drafted sometime in 1849; provided in its 
"Declaration of Rights" section that "[tlhe people shall be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures? The draft constitution of 
1862 contains identical language.1° Both of these constitutions 
were drafted before Congress adopted the first federal 
prohibition of polygamy, the Morrill Antibigamy Act, in 
1862.~~ 
Little independent consideration of search and seizure 
principles is evident in the next Utah Constitutional 
Convention, held in 1872. The Convention used the Nevada 
Constitution of 1864 as a principle reference work. More than 
120 copies of the Nevada Constitution were printed and 
distributed to the delegates to  Utah's 1872 Convention." It 
7. UTAH CONST. art. I, Q 14. 
8. For one account of the drafting history of this document, see Peter 
Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret, 29 B.Y.U. STUD. 7 (Fall 1989). 
9. CONST. OF THE STATE OF DESERET, art. VIII, # 6. 
10. CONST. OF 1862, art. 11, Q 5. 
11. 12 Stat. 501 (1862). For a discussion of the Morrill Antibigamy Act and 
the events leading to its passage, see Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: 
The Polygamy Cases (Part I), 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 308-15 (1964). 
12. Martin B. Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 49 (1954) (unpublished 
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appears that Utah's Draft Constitution of 1872 simply 
incorporated Nevada's search and seizure guarantee. Like the 
Nevada Constitution, the Draft Constitution forbade 
"unreasonable seizures and searches." The Draft Constitution 
also provided that no warrants shall issue "but on probable 
cause" specifying "the place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be seized."13 The 
italicized language precisely tracks the Nevada Constitution, 
but not the standard Fourth Amendment formulation. The 
important point for present purposes, however, is that the 
drafters of the proposed Utah Constitutions incorporated 
search and seizure provisions for the Utah "Bill of Rights" in 
1849, 1860, and 1872. This was well before the antipolygamy 
raids began in earnest because, as Panek notes, "[tlhe Poland 
Act of 1874 paved the way for polygamy convictions" and raids 
were heaviest in the period 1884 to 1889.14 
Even during the period of heavy raids, rather than 
strengthen the search and seizure provision, the drafters of 
Utah's Constitution continued to  follow existing law. The Draft 
Constitution of 1882 contains a search and seizure provision 
almost identical to the Fourth Amendment.15 Aside from 
capitalizations and commas, it differs only in using the singular 
"warrant," "on" probable cause rather than "upon," and the 
awkward and repetitive formulation "place or places to  be 
searched, and the person or  persons, and thing or things to  be 
seized." The Draft Constitution of 1887 is identical, with the 
exception of cleaning up the last phrase to make it follow the 
Fourth Amendment exactly-"place to be searched, and the 
persons or things t o  be seized."16 In 1895, the final version of 
the search and seizure section was altered only slightly. 
Compared to the 1887 version, article I, section 14 uses the 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah). 
13. DRAFT CONST. OF 1872, art. I, 8 18 (emphasis added) (following NEV. 
CONST. art. I, 5 18). 
14. Panek, supra note 1, at 317, 319. For an excellent general description of 
the polygamy raids, see EDWIN B. FIRMAGE & RICHARD C. W G R U M ,  ZION IN THE 
COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS 1830-1900, 125-260 (1988). 
15. DRAFT CONST. OF 1882, art. I, 3 16. In my earlier article, I inaccurately 
described the search and seizure provisions in the 1882 and 1887 constitutions, 
reporting that the Nevada formulation continued through those years. See Cassell, 
supm note *, at 802. 
16. See DRAFT CONST. OF 1887, art. I, 8 19. 
11 UTAH SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 5 
word "upon" rather than "on" (tracking the Fourth Amendment) 
and uses the singular "person or thing to be seized." 
In support of my interpretation that article I, section 14 
parrots the Fourth Amendment or a similar state provision, I 
have canvassed other state constitutions. None of them appears 
to follow exactly the diction of the Utah Constitution. For 
example, New York is sometimes cited as a foundation for the 
Utah Constitution, particularly in light of Joseph Smith's 
residence there." However, New York did not adopt a 
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures until well after the Utah Constitution was adopted.18 
Many of the Mormon leaders had experience with the Illinois 
government from their time in Nauvoo and used the Illinois 
Constitution as a source for the Deseret Constitution of 1849, a 
precursor to the Utah Constituti~n.'~ But the Illinois 
provision does not appear t o  be the model for article I, section 
14.20 Other constitutions from the Northwest, many of which 
were adopted shortly before the Utah Constitutional 
Convention, have also been suggested as sources for provisions 
in the Utah Con~titution,~' but article I, section 14 does not 
seem to trace its lineage directly to any of them. Search and 
seizure provisions that differ, albeit slightly, from the Utah 
provision are found in the constitutions of Idaho, Montana, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and W~orning.~~ Since the 
drafters of the Utah Constitution simply adopted the federal 
Fourth Amendment formulation, it is difficult to  argue that the 
Utah provision should be more broadly interpreted. 
Further confirmation of this point is provided by the 
framers' apparently deliberate decision not to adopt other, more 
expansive versions of the search and seizure protection. In 
particular, the drafters did not adopt the broad protection of 
personal privacy found in article I, section 7 of the Washington 
Constitution, which provides: "No person shall be disturbed in 
17. See John J. Flynn, Fedemlism and Viable State GovernmentThe History 
of Utah's Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 323. 
18. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, 8 12 (adopted Nov. 8, 1938). 
19. See Hickman, supra note 12, at 42-44. 
20. See ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. VIII, 8 7 (wording of search and seizure 
provision is substantially different from Utah's). 
21. See Hickman, supra note 12, at 72. 
22. See IDAHO CONST. OF 1889, art. I, 8 17; MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. 111, 
8 7; N.D. CONST. OF 1889, art. I, 8 18; S.D. CONST. OF 1889, art. VI, 8 11; WYO. 
C o ~ s r .  OF 1890, art. I, 8 4. 
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his private &airs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law." In drafting this provision, the Washington Constitutional 
Convention of 1889 specifically declined to adopt the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment, preferring a broader f~rmulation.~~ 
The decision of the Utah Constitutional Convention of 1895 not 
to  incorporate the Washington formulation cannot be ascribed 
t o  the drafters' ignorance of events there, as they used the 
Washington Constitution as a source for Utah constitutional 
 provision^.^^ The decision not to follow the Washington 
approach is si@icant because it confirms that delegates to  the 
Utah Constitutional Convention were not looking to create 
expansive protections in this area. 
So far my analysis rests solely on the texts of the various 
search and seizure provisions. What of the available drafting 
records from the Utah Constitutional Convention of 1895? The 
records, so far as one can discern, imply that the provision was 
prosaic. On March 25,1895, the Convention heard the proposed 
provision. The records of the Convention reveal only that 
"[slection 14 was read and passed without amendment."25 The 
fact that the provision did not engender any discussion 
suggests that it was unoriginal and, therefore, uncontroversial. 
This conclusion is strengthened by other indications in the 
records of the Convention, which strongly suggest that the 
drafters' main concern in writing provisions dealing with law 
enforcement and criminal procedure was to track prevailing 
law-not to create some new, expansive protections against 
perceived law enforcement abuses. The best indication of the 
drafters' approach comes from the discussion surrounding the 
general criminal procedure provision in the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 12. The section contains a standard list of 
protections for suspects in criminal cases, including the rights 
t o  counsel, to  confront witnesses, to  have compulsory process to 
secure witnesses, and to a speedy public trial. Much of the 
language for article I, section 12 was taken straight from the 
Washington Constitution,Z6 a recently adopted provision that 
was probably regarded as the "state of the art" in standard 
23. See THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION: 1889, at 497 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed. 1962). 
24. See 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE UTAH 
CONSMTUTIONAL CONVENTION 1125 (1898) (Star Printing Co. 1898) [hereinafter 
UTAH CONSITI'UTIONAL CONVENTION]. 
25. 1 UTAH CONSITTUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 319. 
26. Compare, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12. 
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criminal procedure  formulation^.^^ Much of the language in 
the Washington provision tracks almost verbatim the 
provisions in the federal Bill of Rights and many state 
 constitution^.^^ 
The drafting history confirms that this textual coincidence 
between the Utah and other state formulations is no accident. 
The most detailed discussion in the Convention records 
concerns the confrontation clause, which provides a usefd 
illustration of the point. As originally proposed at the 
Convention, the amendment would have guaranteed the 
accused the right "to meet the witnesses against him face to 
face."zg On March 23, 1895, William Van Home proposed to 
amend the confrontation provision by adding to it the phrase 
"except where evidence by deposition may be authorized by 
law."30 Charles Varian then opposed the amendment because 
"[tlhe provisions of this section are substantially those in every 
constitution, I believe. They have received judicial 
interpretation and constmction for many years . . . ."31 Varian 
went on to explain that court cases had authorized the use of 
depositions at trial where the defendant had cross-examined 
the witness and the witness was dead or beyond the reach of 
process. Varian concluded with a plea to avoid disturbing 
existing law: 
Why not leave it as it is? Why not leave it within the ancient 
landmarks, so that every lawyer and every layman may know 
just what this does mean? Judicial decision after decision, all 
in one line, particularly have determined the meaning of this 
language as the committee have reported it here. Why should 
we stray away and put something in there that will tend to 
bring about and will doubtless bring about this confision. and 
conflict in interpretation?s2 
Immediately following Varian's speech, the proposed 
amendment was rejected.33 M e r  the rejection, the next 
speaker was David Evans, who explained his vote: "[Tlhese are 
27. The Washington Constitutional Convention met in 1889. 
28. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI; BARRY LATZER, STATE 
C O N ~ I O N S  AND CRJMINAL JUSTICE 203-04 (1991). 
29. 1 UTAH C O N ~ O N A L  CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 311. 
30. Id. at 306. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 307-08. 
33. Id. at 308. 
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ancient landmarks and should not be disturbed, because they 
go directly t o  the protection of the individual liberty and 
protection of the citizen, but we cannot go too far in the 
interest of the men charged with   rime."^ Later the delegates 
briefly returned to  the confrontation language, making it 
conform even more closely to existing texts. Without extensive 
discussion, the delegates changed the phrase "to meet the 
witnesses against him face to  face" to "to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him," the phrasing that appears in the 
United States Con~titution.~~ 
The same intent to track prevailing law is evident in 
discussion of another part of article 1, section 12, the provision 
providing that "[iln no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed."36 David Evans proposed 
amending this language by striking the words "before final 
judgment.'"' Thomas Maloney urged rejection of the proposed 
amendment, explaining 
The committee on . . . declaration of rights knew what they 
were doing when they made the report. They were fifteen 
good men-men who knew their business and this article now 
is copied word for word from the declaration of rights of the 
state of Washington. . . . I hope both [this] amendment[] will 
be voted down and that we will sustain the committee's 
report. It comes from Washington and other states, which 
have this same language in their declaration of rights?' 
The proposed amendment was defeated.3g 
In recent opinions the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
the drafters' intent to  remain inside "ancient landmarks." In 
Arnerican Fork City v. Crosgrove? for example, the court 
reksed to extend rights for criminal defendants under Utah's 
self-incrimination clause41 beyond those contained in the 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 311. For a discussion of the meaning of the Utah Confrontation 
Clause in light of this drafting history, see Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales 
of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. , (forthcoming). 
36. UTAH CONST. art. I, 8 12. 
37. 1 UTAH C O N ~ O N A L  CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 310. 
38. Id. at 310-11. 
39. Id. at 311. 
40. 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985). 
41. UTAH CONST. art. I, 5 12. 
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federal self-incrimination provision.42 The lead opinion by 
Justice Durham cited as authority the speech from Charles 
Varian quoted above and explained that "if any intent can be 
derived from the proceedings of Utah's Constitutional 
Convention, it is that the framers intended the privilege to 
have the same scope that it had under similar constitutional 
provisions, which was the scope it had at common 
Convergence with existing law is a feature not only of the 
criminal procedure portions of the Utah Constitution, but other 
parts as well. As Professor Flym has commented, with only 
slight exaggeration, "it is impossible to  say that the Utah 
Constitution of 1896 was drafted by Utahns for Utah."44 
Instead, "the convention borrowed heavily from earlier Utah 
constitutions and other state  constitution^.'^^ Martin Berkeley 
Hickman's often-cited doctoral thesis on Utah constitutional 
law reaches the same conclusion, noting that "[tlhe constant 
appeal to  the authority of other states is one of the most 
striking impressions one gains from reading the debates."46 
Resort to  other existing authority is hardly surprising in view 
of Congress' direction in the Enabling Act of July, 1894, that, to 
be acceptable, "the constitution shall be republican in 
form. . . and not be repugnant to  the constitution of the 
United States."47 
The Enabling Act also explains one other provision of the 
Utah Constitution that is sometimes cited as proof that the 
drafters were concerned about abusive searches. Article I11 of 
the Utah Constitution provides that "[nlo inhabitant of this 
State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of 
his or her mode of religious Noting that the 
section "is unique insofar as it proscribes disturbance of person 
or property," Ken Wallentine has argued that this section is 
"evidence of the drafters' acute sensitivity t o  freedom from 
42. U.S. C o ~ s r .  amend. V. 
43. American Fork City, 701 P.2d at 1073; accord KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 
P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983). 
44. Flynn, supm note 17, at 324. 
45. Id. at 323. 
46. Hickman, supm note 12, at 72. 
47. Enabling Act of July, 1894, ch. 138, $ 3 (1894). 
48. UTAH CONST. art. 11.. 
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searches of home and pr~perty."~ Wallentine also notes that 
Article I11 "had no predecessor in earlier  constitution^."^^ 
Wallentine's argument is flawed: article I11 appears in the 
Constitution drafted in  1895 because of congressional direction, 
not Convention deliberations. The Enabling Act of 1894 
required that the Utah Constitution contain various provisions, 
including at the top of Congress' prescribed list (presumably to 
protect non-Mormons): "First. That perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of 
said State shall ever be molested in person or property on 
account of his or her mode of religious worship: Provided, That 
polygamous or plural marriages are forever pr~hib i ted ."~~ The
Utah Constitutional Convention simply adopted this language 
in Article 111, and added the introduction that it "shall be 
irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the 
people of this State."52 Thus Article I11 shows little about the 
intent of Utah's drafters other than compliance with 
congressional  specification^?^ 
111. CONCERN FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The drafters of the Utah Constitution had another reason 
for avoiding different and expansive rights for criminal 
defendants. They knew that with Utah's entry into the Union, 
the state's citizens would assume responsibility for the day-to- 
day administration of the criminal justice system and would 
soon need to prosecute crimes effectively in state courts. The 
antipolygamy raids could be seen as the peculiar creature of 
rule by unelected federal outsiders. As Panek recounts, the 
federal government was responsible for creating and enforcing 
the antipolygamy regime in the Utah territory.54 Congress 
passed the Poland Act, the Edmunds Act, and the Edmunds- 
Tucker Act to confer power on federal law enforcement agents. 
The U.S. Marshal and his deputies conducted the antipolygamy 
raids. The United States Attorney prosecuted the resulting 
cases. These federal enforcement efforts were conducted 
49. Wallentine, supra note 4, at 280. 
50. Id. 
51. Enabling Ad of July, 1864, ch. 138, 8 3 (1894). 
52. UTAH CONST. art. III. 
53. See Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 928 (Utah 
1993) (recounting the history surrounding Enabling Ad). 
54. Panek, supra note 1, at 317. 
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without regard to  local ~ensibilities.~~ With the disappearance 
of these religiously-influenced prosecutions dictated by 
Washington, D.C., the framers of the Utah Constitution-both 
Mormon and non-Mormon-would have seen little need t o  
adopt provisions that would increase the burdens on their own 
state criminal justice system. 
This sentiment is suggested, for instance, in a petition 
signed by 22,626 women of Utah and sent to Congress in 1876: 
We ask to be relieved from the unjust and law-breaking 
officials forced upon us by the Government, and that we may 
have the jurisdiction of our own courts and the selection of 
our own officers, as we had in the past, when our cities were 
free from dram-shops, gambling-dens, and houses of infamy. 
As mothers and sisters, we earnestly appeal to you for help, 
that our sons may be saved from drunkenness and vice and 
our daughters from the power of the seducer . . . .56 
A later Epistle of the First Presidency expressed grave concern 
about polygamy prosecutions but also noted "[tlhere are now in 
the city some 6 Brothels, 40 Tap Rooms, a number of Gambling 
Houses, Pool Tables and other disreputable concerns, all run," 
the Epistle noted, "by non-M~rmons."~~ Citizens concerned 
about ridding their cities of "dram shops, gambling-dens, and 
houses of infamy" or brothels, tap rooms, and gambling houses 
were not likely to make prosecution of those crimes more 
~ 1 c u l t .  
These concerns about crime were consistent with the 
prevailing mood in the country at large. As Professor Lawrence 
M. Friedman has noted, in the later part of the nineteenth 
century, 
a new set of fears replaced fears of "tyranny:" fear of the 
criminal. To the dominant segments of society, the organs of 
state posed no threat to American legal order. Rather, the 
threat came from defendants-the "dangerous classes," which 
included "rural criminals, urban criminals, rural paupers, 
urban paupers, and tramps."58 
55. See GUSTIVE 0. LARSON, THE "AMERICANIZATION" F UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 
302 (1971) (describing "vindictive carpetbag methods" of law enforcement). 
56. H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 42, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1876) (emphasis added). 
57. Epistle of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, in DESERET NEWS, Apr. 14, 1886, at 196. 
58. Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the 
Late Nineteenth Century, 53 ALB. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1989). 
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As a result, criminal justice reform generally "focused on ways 
to control and eliminate crime, rather than on ways to protect 
the accused."59 
While apprehension about crime was national in scope, it 
was particularly pronounced in the western states, which 
responded with so-called "frontier justice."60 Generally 
speaking, "[flrontiersmen found technical errors thwarting 
substantial justice repugnant."' Shortly after their arrival in 
Utah, the Mormon pioneers established rules for a judiciary for 
the State of Deseret. The pioneers addressed the subject of 
legal technicalities bluntly, providing that: "It shall be the duty 
of the [Supreme] Court to . . . in no ease suffer technicalities to 
frustrate the ends of J u s t i ~ e . " ~ ~  Likewise, local justices of the 
peace were instructed "to execute justice without respect to 
persons or favor, or the technicalities of the law.7763 
This strand of Utah tradition has sometimes been 
characterized as "mountain common law." This vibrant phrase 
was rescued from the dustbin of history by Kenneth L. Cannon 
II's article.* The article recounts the celebrated defense of 
Howard Egan, who was charged with killing a man who had 
"seduced" his wife in pre-statehood Utah. Attorney and 
Mormon Apostle George A. Smith successfully defended Egan 
before the jury by telling them to look "for justice instead of 
some dark, sly, or technical course." He made several 
references to this "mountain common law7' in his closing.65 
59. Id. at 272. 
60. See WAYNE GARD, FRONTIER JUSTICE (1949); cf W. EUGENE HOLLON, 
FRONTIER VIOLENCE: ANOTHER LOOK 216 (1974) (decrying the "tendency to over- 
emphasize the violent side of the frontier*). 
61. GORDON M. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 1850-1912 
27 (1987) (referring specifically to  Arizona Constitutional Convention); see Richard 
M. Brown, Violence and Vigilantism in American History, 173, 186 in AMERICAN 
LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISI'ORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Lawrence M. 
Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988) ("Deficiencies in the judicial system 
were the source of repeated complaints by frontiersmen. They made the familiar 
point that the ~ m e r i c i  system of administering justice favored the accused rather 
than society. The guilty, they charged, utilized every loophole for the evasion of 
punishment."). 
62. ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE FOR THE ORGANIZATION F THE JUDICIARY OF THE 
STATE OF DESERET 5 9 (1850). 
63. Id. 5 30. 
64. K e ~ e t h  L. Cannon 11, "Mountain Common Law": The Extralegal 
Punishment of Seducers in Early Utah, 51 UTAH HIST. Q. 308, 310-17 (1983). 
65. Id. at 312 (citing .G.D. Watt, Indictment for Murder, DESERET EVENING 
NEWS, Nov. 15, 1851, at A2). 
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This desire for effective law enforcement even led Utahns 
to occasionally resort to unlawfd measures to ensure that 
"justice was done." Professor Larry R. Gerlach has provided the 
most detailed information on this subject, explaining that 
eleven men were lynched in Utah before statehood, a number 
equalling the authorized judicial executions during the 
period? Again the Utah history in this area fits within a 
national context. As Cannon explains, "[tlhough by no means 
universally approved of in nineteenth-century America, 
extralegal violence was clearly condoned by many Americans, 
especially those living in the southern and western parts of the 
c~untry."~' Let me make clear that my point here is not to in 
any way approve extra-legal measures taken by Utahns before 
statehood. Vigilantism has produced many terrible tragedies in 
Utah as well as elsewhere in the country. I am suggesting only 
that an accurate interpretation of the historical record must 
note that justice for perceived criminal wrongdoers is a strong 
tradition in the state. Given the historical concern for effective 
law enforcement, one must approach with caution an 
interpretation of Utah's search and seizure provision that gives 
decisive importance to sympathy for criminal defendants in 
polygamy prosecutions. 
IV. RELIGIOUS CONCILIATION AFTER THE END OF THE RAIDS 
With the announcement of the W o o M  Manifesto in 
1890~' and the corresponding end of the antipolygamy raids, a 
period of religious reconciliation developed in Utah that must 
be considered in any complete historical analysis of events 
leading to  the Utah Constitutional Convention in 1895.~~ 
Professor Jean Bickmore White's recent article is an important 
contribution in filling what has been an area in need of 
historical analysis.'' As suggested in the article's 
title-"Prelude t o  Statehood: Coming Together in the 
66. Larry R. Gerlach, Ogden's "Horrible Tragedy": The Lgnching of George 
Segal, 49 UTAH HIST. Q. 157, 159-60 (1981). 
67. Cannon, supra note 64, at 327. 
68. 6 BRIGHAM H. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LA~TER-DAY SAINTS 220 (1930) (discussing the announcement of 
the end of the practice of polygamy). 
69. Panek's article extends only through events in 1889. Panek, supra note 1, 
at 316. 
70. Jean B. White, Prelude to Statehood: Coming Together in the 1890s, 62 
UTAH HIST. Q. 300 (1994). 
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1890s"-Utah moved beyond the divisiveness of the 
antipolygamy raids in ways that can only be regarded as 
"striking." State-funded schools were established in 1890 as an 
alternative t o  sectarian public education. The Chamber of 
Commerce in Salt Lake City began to  integrate Mormon and 
non-Mormon economic interests under the motto of h o  politics 
or religion in the Chamber." On the political front, in 1891 the 
Mormon leadership disbanded the People's party, and the 
development of a traditional, RepublicanflDemocrat, two-party 
system was en~ouraged.~' As Professor White concludes, 
[tlhe "new Utah" that arose out of the Americanization 
process of the 1890s was built on a troubled past by bridging 
deep divisions along political, social, economic, and religious 
lines. Bringing two competitive cultures close enough together 
to make statehood possible was not an easy task, but it was 
accomplished by men and women who cared more about the 
promise of the fbture than about nursing old wounds of the 
past? 
The Utah Constitution was a product of this new spirit of 
cooperation among different religious traditions. Both Mormons 
and non-Mormons joined in a celebration at the Saltair resort 
when President Cleveland signed the Utah statehood bill in 
July 1894.~~ In November they elected both Mormons and 
non-Mormons to draft the state constitutional provisions; 28 
non-Mormon delegates were elected among the 107 delegates t o  
the Constitutional C~nvention.'~   hose who would, in effect, 
resurrect religious animosities and give them an important role 
in the drafting of the Constit~tion'~ miss this prevailing 
spirit. Professor White has captured this sense nicely in 
explaining that the Convention realized that its task was 
71. See LARSON, supra note 55, at  290 ("Religious differences yielded to new 
political alignments which often pitted church leaders against each other and found 
former enemies side by side on important issues."). 
72. Id. at 315; see also id. at 274 (stating that the years following the 
manifesto "witnessed a rapid improvement in Mormon-Gentile relations"). 
73. Stanley S. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 95, 100 
(1957). 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Wallentine, supra note 4, at  279 (arguing for broad search and 
seizure construction because in various Utah constitutional conventions "[tlhe large 
majority of delegates were prominent Mormon religious leaders, of the sort likely 
to share the views of the church leadership, and in any event, faithfully espouse 
the official position"). 
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to produce a document that [would] be accepted by various 
and conflicting groups in their own time, and still survive in 
years to come. 
In 1895, Mormons and non-Mormons, Republicans and 
Democrats, sat down together to complete the last task 
remaining before finally attaining statehood. . . . I t  was not 
because they stood above the events of their times but 
because they understood them so well that they were 
determined to s~cceed.'~ 
Those who would interpret Utah's search and seizure provision 
by reference to the antipolygamy raids would not have fared 
well in arguments to the Convention's delegates. How would 
they explain their position t o  non-Mormon delegate Charles S. 
Varian, who apparently voted for article I, section 14? As U.S. 
Attorney, Varian aggressively prosecuted many polygamists,77 
but was far and away the most active (and perhaps the most 
influential) of all of the delegates.?' They would also need t o  
explain their views to  Convention President John Henry Smith, 
who throughout his life-particularly during the  
Convention-made it his business to  cultivate friendships 
among the non-Mormons and to attempt to reach a consensus 
that transcended religious boundaries.7g 
In light of these historical considerations, it seems hard t o  
argue that the antipolygamy raids caused the drafters of the 
76. Jean B. White, The Making of the Convention President: The Political 
Education of John Henry Smith, 39 UTAH HIV. Q. 350, 368 (1971). 
77. Ivins, supra note 73, at 100; see Indignation Over Deputies Doings, 
DESERET NEWS, Jan. 27, 1886, at 27 (describing prosecution by Varian). 
78. Ivins, supra note 73, at  113-14; see also Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal 
Co., 86 P. 865, 868 (Utah 1906) (relying on colloquy involving Varian to determine 
meaning of constitutional provision); Another Busy Day, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 5, 
1895, at 5. Apparently, attorney David Evans, who had served as an Assistant 
U.S. Attorney under Varian from 1887-91, also voted for article I, section 14. 
79. See generally White, supra note 76, at 368-69. White cites, among other 
sources, Smith's obituary by the SALT LARE TRIBUNE, Od. 14, 1911, that noted his 
efforts at  broadmindedness" and explained "he did not obtrude his polygamy." 
White has also reviewed a number of church leaders7 diaries dealing with this 
period of time and does not recall seeing any connection of search and seizure 
issues raised by the antipolygamy raids with the drafting of the 1895 Constitution. 
Letter from Jean Bickmore White, Emeritus Professor, Utah State Univ. to Paul G. 
Cassell, Professor, Univ. of Utah College of Law (Feb 15, 1995) (on file with 
author). 
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Utah Constitution to adopt an expansive protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures in article I, section 14. 
Unexciting though it may be to  those interested in searching 
for new (and heretofore undiscovered) rights, the best reading 
of article I, section 14, is that it was simply designed to track 
prevailing law and provide Utahns with the protections 
generally available in most other states. As we approach the 
Constitution's centennial, this interpretation is most faithful to 
the farsighted intentions of its framers. 
